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Recognizing and Regulating Home Schooling 
in California:  Balancing Parental and State 
Interests in Education 
Paul A. Alarcón* 
INTRODUCTION:  THE RACHEL L. AND JONATHAN L. DECISIONS 
On February 28, 2008, the California Court of Appeal for the 
Second Appellate District caused alarm on a national level1 by 
ruling that home schooling2 in California is illegal unless the 
parent has a teaching credential.3  In reaching this conclusion, 
the court of appeal relied almost exclusively on a fifty-five year 
old California superior court appellate department case and a 
forty-seven year old California court of appeal case.4  Both cases 
had held that statutory predecessors to the private school 
exemption5 to California’s compulsory school attendance statute6 
were inapplicable to home schooling.7 
* J.D. Candidate 2010, Chapman University School of Law; B.A. 2007, Thomas 
Aquinas College.  Prospective Law Clerk to the Honorable J. Leon Holmes, Chief Judge, 
United States District Court, Eastern District of Arkansas.  I am extremely grateful to 
Professor Scott Howe, Professor Carolyn Young, James Harman, and Janeen Steel for 
their thoughtful comments and editorial assistance; and to my parents, Mario and 
Maureen Alarcón, for their tireless efforts to provide me with the best education possible.  
Of course, I thank my wife, Claire Alarcón, for her loving and constant support. 
1 Andrea Longbottom, Rude Awakening Court Ruling Alarms Homeschool 
Community, THE HOME SCHOOL COURT REPORT, May–Jun. 2008, at 11, (finding that a 
mayor, op-ed pieces of almost every major newspaper, the general public, the media, 
public school teachers, and people around the world were shocked that “an educational 
alternative as solidly established as homeschooling was actually being called illegal”). 
 2 Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 576 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 
(“We use the terms ‘home school’ and ‘home schooling’ to refer to full-time education in the 
home by a parent or guardian who does not necessarily possess a teaching credential.”). 
 3 In re Rachel L., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 77, 79–83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (decertified for 
publication). The court discussed “whether parents can legally ‘home school’ their 
children” and held, based on two prior cases: 
that enrollment and attendance in a public full-time day school is required by 
California law for minor children unless (1) the child is enrolled in a private 
full-time day school and actually attends that private school, (2) the child is 
tutored by a person holding a valid state teaching credential for the grade 
being taught, or (3) one of the other few statutory exemptions to compulsory 
public school attendance applies to the child. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 4 Id. at 80–83. 
 5 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48222 (West 2006). 
 6 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 2006). 
 7 People v. Turner, 263 P.2d 685 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1953); In re Shinn, 16 
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However, in the fifty years since these decisions, home 
schooling has grown explosively from a curiosity on the fringe of 
education to a competitive and widely-practiced instructional 
form.8  As a result of In re Rachel L., parents wondered if they 
would have to leave California to avoid criminal prosecution.9  
Home schooling advocates were shocked that an educational 
methodology—which had gained universal acceptance throughout 
the United States as a legal form of education—could be 
effectively outlawed in the country’s most populous state.10  
Further, the court of appeal’s decision to settle the general 
question of whether “parents can legally ‘home school’ their 
children,”11 was particularly surprising since Rachel L. was a 
confidential dependency case involving issues unrelated to home 
schooling.12  Less than a month later, the Court, perhaps on 
Cal. Rptr. 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).  Aside from the private school exemption, the only 
exemption to California’s compulsory school attendance statute which could apply to 
home schooling is Section 48224 of the California Education Code, the private tutor 
exemption.  However, this exemption requires the tutor to have a state teaching 
credential for the grade being taught and therefore is not applicable to most home 
schooling parents. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48224 (West 2006). 
 8 Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off The Grid: Constitutional Constraints on 
Homeschooling, 96 CAL. L. REV. 123, 124 (2008) (“Home schooling is no longer a ‘fringe’ 
phenomenon.”) (citations omitted); Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 
591 n.31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“Studies indicate 2.2 percent of the entire student 
population of the United States was home schooled in 2003, up from 1.7 percent in 
1999.”); U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, The Condition of Education 
2005, June 2005, at 32, available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/2005094.pdf (“In 2003, 
the number of home schooled students was 1.1 million, an increase from 850,000 in 
1999.”); Patricia M. Lines, U.S. Department of Education, Homeschoolers:  Estimating 
Numbers and Growth, Spring 1999, at 1, available at http://www.ed.gov/ 
offices/OERI/SAI/homeschool/homeschoolers.pdf (finding “[a] retroactive estimate done in 
1988 suggested 10,000 to 15,000 children received their education at home in the late 
1970s” and that “[e]arlier estimates, based on different methodologies, suggested 60,000 
to 125,000 school-aged children for the fall of 1983; and 122,000 to 244,000 for fall of 1985; 
between 150,000 to 300,000 for fall of 1988”). 
 9 Longbottom, supra note 1, at 11 (“California member families called HSLDA 
[Home School Legal Defense Association], wondering if they should move out of the state, 
or when a truant officer would come knocking at their door and demand their children.”). 
 10 Id.  HSLDA President Mike Smith commented: 
To say that I was shocked that the court in California ruled that teacher’s 
certification was the only legal way to teach a child in California is putting it 
mildly . . . . It reminded me of the days when HSLDA began 25 years ago and 
teacher’s certification was the ‘sacred cow’ that states were clinging to in an 
effort to keep home schooling from becoming a viable option. 
Id. 
 11 In re Rachel L., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 77, 79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (decertified for 
publication). 
 12 Id. at 80 (“A Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition was filed on behalf 
of three minor children after the eldest of them reported physical and emotional 
mistreatment by the children’s father.”). 
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account of the overwhelmingly negative reaction to its decision, 
depublished its decision and granted a petition for rehearing.13 
The court of appeal issued its new decision, Jonathan L. v. 
Superior Court, on August 8, 2008.14  While refusing to back 
down from its position that no absolute constitutional right to 
home school exists,15 the Jonathan L. court held that California’s 
private school exemption16 “permit[s] home schooling as a species 
of private school education.”17  The court of appeal found the 
statutory language of the exemption to be ambiguous with 
respect to its applicability to home schooling.18  This allowed the 
court of appeal to conclude, based on various legislative acts 
relating to the private school exemption, that “[w]hile the 
Legislature has never acted to expressly supersede Turner and 
Shinn, it has acted as though home schooling is, in fact, 
permitted in California.”19  In addition, the Jonathan L. court 
found it significant that the Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
the Department of Education, the Governor, and the Attorney 
General all accepted home schooling as a legal type of private 
schooling.20  Finally, the court of appeal stated that its 
interpretation of the private school exemption avoided serious 
constitutional questions about the validity of a law which renders 
home schooling illegal.21 
The court of appeal concluded its opinion with the 
observation that, “the fact that home schooling is permitted in 
California as the result of implicit legislative recognition rather 
than explicit legislative action has resulted in a near absence of 
 13 Jonathan L. v. S.C.L.A., B192878, 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 548 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 
25, 2008).  The Jonathan L. court received and considered sixteen amicus briefs from a 
wide range of governmental and private parties.  Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 571, 577 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 14 Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571. 
 15 Id. at 592 (“[N]o such absolute right to home school exists.”).  Because the court 
found that parents do not have an absolute right to home school, it held that a 
dependency court may restrict home schooling if necessary to achieve California’s interest 
in ensuring a child’s safety. Id. at 592–94.  However, the court recognized that grave 
constitutional issues regarding parents’ first amendment rights and the right to direct 
their children’s upbringing would be raised “[i]f home schools are not permitted in 
California unless under the private tutor exemption (requiring the tutor to be 
credentialed).” Id. at 591. 
 16 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48222 (West 2006). 
 17 Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 576.  The Court remanded the case to the 
dependency court to consider whether the factual situation before it justified restricting 
home schooling because of an overriding governmental interest in the child’s safety.  Id. at 
594. 
 18 Id. at 586. 
 19 Id. at 588–89. 
 20 Id. at 591. 
 21 Id. 
Do Not Delete 4/14/2010 10:37 PM 
394 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 13:391
objective criteria and oversight for home schooling.”22  The 
Jonathan L. court contrasted this lack of oversight with 
numerous limitations utilized by other states to regulate home 
schooling.23  Consequently, the court of appeal stated that 
“additional clarity in this area of the law would be helpful.”24 
This Comment focuses on the Jonathan L. court’s plea for 
clarity.  First, this Comment proposes that the California 
Legislature explicitly legalize home schooling by enacting a new 
statutory exemption to California’s compulsory school attendance 
statute.  Second, it suggests that the government impose two 
limitations on home schooling: one which requires parents to file 
an annual notice of intent to home school their children, and 
another which requires home schooled students to take annual 
standardized tests.  These requirements will protect California’s 
compelling interest in an educated citizenry while minimizing 
any imposition upon the parental right to direct the education of 
their children. 
A perusal of the history of education in America reveals a 
general trend toward government control over the education of 
children.25  The universal adoption of compulsory school 
attendance laws is, perhaps, the clearest reflection of this 
tendency.26  The enactment of such laws reflects the principle 
that states have a compelling interest in education.27  However, 
this trend towards government oversight has its detractors.28  
Modern-day home schooling represents one clear educational 
form sharply divergent from the general trend towards 
government control.  This educational form is founded upon a 
belief in the supremacy of the parental right to direct the 
upbringing and education of their children.29 
In the context of home schooling, these two interests—the 
governmental and parental—are opposed because home schooling 
 22 Id. at 595. 
 23 Id. at 595–96 (listing a variety of common limitations imposed on home schooling 
in other states). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See infra Part I. 
 26 National Conference of State Legislatures, Compulsory Education: Overview, 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/educ/CompulsoryEd.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2010) (“Today, 
every state and territory requires children to enroll in public or private education or to be 
home-schooled.”). 
 27 See infra Part II.C. 
 28 See infra Part I. 
 29 Rob Reich, Why Home Schooling Should Be Regulated, in HOMESCHOOLING IN 
FULL VIEW:  A READER 109, 110 (Bruce S. Cooper ed., 2005) (“Home schoolers of all stripes 
believe that they alone should decide how their children are educated, and they join 
together in order to press for the absence of regulations or the most permissive regulation 
possible.”). 
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parents want complete control over their children’s environment 
and curriculum, removed from the supervision of public 
officials.30  However, governmental oversight of some kind is 
necessary to protect the state’s interest in ensuring that students 
are receiving an adequate education.31  Without limitations, the 
California Constitution’s assertion of a governmental interest in 
education becomes meaningless rhetoric, or at least, a mere 
desire which the state is unable to enforce.32  On the other hand, 
home schooling limitations necessarily impose upon the parental 
interest to the degree they limit and direct the parents’ actions.33  
Where such limitations unreasonably trample upon the parental 
interest in directing the education of their children, courts have 
found the restrictions unconstitutional.34  Hence, the question 
arises as to what limitations, if any, should be adopted, which 
guarantee that each and every home schooled child receives an 
adequate education, but which do not unconstitutionally impose 
upon the parental interest. 
In order to answer this question a consideration of both the 
state and parental interests in education is required.  According 
to the United States Supreme Court, the parents’ interest in 
directing the education of their children is a fundamental 
constitutional right.35  Whereas, the state interest in an educated 
citizenry is a compelling interest in ensuring that students 
become economically independent and civically responsible.36 
In order to select the most suitable limitations, a review of 
restrictions commonly adopted by other states is helpful because 
 30 Id. 
 31 See infra Part II.A. 
 32 CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
 33 See Reich, supra note 29. 
 34 Jeffery v. O’Donnell, 702 F. Supp. 516, 518 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (finding a private tutor 
statute which required the parent to be “properly qualified” and the curriculum 
“satisfactory” to be unconstitutionally vague); Mazanec v. N. Judson-San Pierre Sch. 
Corp., 614 F. Supp. 1152, 1160 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (finding that parents have the 
constitutional right to educate their children in a home environment and that “[i]t is now 
doubtful that the requirements of a formally licensed or certified teacher . . . would now 
pass constitutional muster”), aff’d, 798 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1986); People v. DeJonge, 501 
N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993) (striking down a teacher certification requirement for private 
and home schools as unconstitutional); State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 527, 532–33 
(Minn. 1985) (finding that a requirement that private and home school teachers have 
qualifications “essentially equivalent” to public school teachers is too vague to “serve as a 
basis for a criminal conviction,” and therefore an unconstitutional violation of due process 
under the 14th Amendment); State v. Popanz, 332 N.W.2d 750, 756 (Wis. 1983) (holding 
the state compulsory school attendance statute was “void for vagueness insofar as it fails 
to define ‘private school’”); Roemhild v. State, 308 S.E.2d 154, 159 (Ga. 1983) (holding the 
state compulsory school attendance law to be “unconstitutionally vague”). 
 35 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (plurality opinion).  See infra Part 
II.B for a discussion of the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. 
 36 See infra Part II.C. 
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these restrictions are widely accepted as reasonable and effective, 
and they have not been struck down as unconstitutional.37 
Part I of this Comment summarizes the history of education 
in America discussing in particular the emergence of modern 
home schooling.  Part II considers the conflict between the 
governmental and parental interests in education created by 
home schooling and provides an in-depth analysis of these 
dueling interests.  Part III concludes with a proposal for enacting 
a home school exemption to California’s compulsory school 
attendance statute, a consideration of limitations adopted by 
other states, and a proposal for adopting two specific home 
schooling restrictions. 
I.  EDUCATION IN AMERICA:  HOME SCHOOLING AND THE TREND 
TOWARDS GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT 
Since the inception of the United States of America, a 
widespread appreciation of the importance of education has 
existed.38  In fact, Thomas Jefferson proposed a system of free 
schools to be maintained by taxation.39  However, until the public 
or common school movement, education was administered locally 
and usually privately.40  In the early 1800s, prominent educators 
began to successfully advocate the creation of statewide public 
school systems.41  Every state had a system of free public schools 
by 1850.42  Fifty years later the public school movement 
accomplished its objective of mandatory public education for the 
elementary level in almost every state.43  Today, every state has 
enacted compulsory school attendance statutes.44 
Thus, the history of education in the United States is one 
which manifests a trend towards institutionalization and 
government control.45  However, this trend has always had its 
detractors.  For example, heavy opposition to publicly controlled 
schools came from Roman Catholics who believed that the values 
imparted in public schools had unpalatable Protestant biases.46   
 37 See infra Part III.B.1. 
 38 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, INC., THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 18, at 48 
(15th ed. 2002) (“Several of the Founding Fathers expressed belief in the necessity of 
public education . . . .”). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 48–49. 
 42 MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, EDUCATION FREE & COMPULSORY 41 (Ludvig von Mises 
Inst. 1999) (1971). 
 43 Id. 
 44 See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 26. 
 45 EDGAR W. KNIGHT, EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 44 (3rd ed. 1951). 
 46 Carl F. Kaestle, Victory of the Common School Movement:  A Turning Point in 
American Educational History, in HISTORIANS ON AMERICA 23, 26 (George Clack & Paul 
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In the 1950s, home schooling arose as an alternative to the 
public school system.47  At the outset, home schooling was 
dominated by liberal and progressive philosophies.48  However, 
by the early 1990s, home schooling was predominately 
characterized by conservative Christian ideologies.49 
Since its emergence, home schooling has experienced 
explosive growth throughout the nation.  Estimates indicate that 
as few as 10,000 to 15,000 students were home schooled in the 
late 1970s.50  This number increased dramatically in the 1980s—
such that by the end of that decade an estimated 150,000 to 
300,000 students were home schooled in America.51  The 1990s 
saw a continuation of this rapid growth and by 1998 estimates 
put the number of home schooled children at nearly 1 million.52  
The National Center for Education Statistics reports that in 2003 
the number of home schooled students had climbed to 1.1 
million.53 
As public education became universally available, a question 
arose regarding whether the states had the power to force every 
student to attend public schools and thereby eliminate any 
alternate forms of education.54  Given that the public school 
movement included objectives such as uniting a widely diverse 
population and ensuring competent schooling to all citizens,55 
some thought that states had such a power.56  However, in Pierce 
v. Society of Sisters, the United States Supreme Court 
unanimously held that a state act which requires all students to 
attend public school without providing an exception for private 
forms of education, “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of 
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of 
children under their control.”57  In stating that “[t]he child is not 
Malamud eds., 2007), available at http://www.america.gov/publications/books/historians 
onamerica.html. 
 47 Yuracko, supra note 8, at 125. 
 48 Id. at 125–26. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Lines, supra note 8, at 1 (“A retroactive estimate done in 1988 suggested 10,000 to 
15,000 children received their education at home in the late 1970s . . . .”). 
 51 Id. (“Earlier estimates, based on different methodologies, suggested 60,000 to 
125,000 school-aged children for the fall of 1983; and 122,000 to 244,000 for fall of 1985; 
between 150,000 to 300,000 for fall of 1988 . . . .”). 
 52 Id. (“[T]he number could have reached about 1,000,000 children by the 1997–98 
school year.”). 
 53 The Condition of Education 2005, supra note 8, at 32. 
 54 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 531 (1925) (finding Oregon statute’s 
“manifest purpose is to compel general attendance at public schools by normal children, 
between eight and sixteen, who have not completed the eighth grade”). 
 55 ROTHBARD, supra note 42, at 44. 
 56 Id.; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531. 
 57 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35.  Notably, the Oregon statute provided an exception for 
individualized private instruction.  Hence the Court’s ruling in Pierce means that the 
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the mere creature of the State”58 the Court definitively 
determined that the “compulsory” character of the public school 
system is far from absolute.  Rather, certain exceptions must 
exist for alternative forms of education because parents “who 
nurture [their child] and direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations.”59  In later decisions, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the principles laid down in Pierce.60 
In summary, since the founding of America, education has 
generally progressed toward government oversight and control.  
However, forms of education diverging from this general trend 
have developed and gained the protection of the Constitution 
under Pierce.  Home schooling is one such instructional type 
which has undergone significant growth during the past few 
decades. 
II. DUELING INTERESTS:  AN ANALYSIS OF PARENTAL AND STATE 
INTERESTS AND HOW THEY CONFLICT 
If the history of education in the United States reflects a 
trend towards governmental oversight,61 the emergence of home 
schooling clearly represents a diverging movement towards 
independent parental control.62  The latter adopts, as a 
fundamental principle, the parents’ interest in directing the 
upbringing of their children.63  In the context of home schooling, 
this interest inevitably conflicts with the state’s interest in 
education.64  The resolution of this conflict depends upon the 
character of each interest. 
A. Oversight and Control:  An Inevitable Conflict between 
Parents and the State 
In asserting that “[n]o question is raised concerning the 
power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools,” the United 
States Supreme Court made it clear that Pierce does not 
constitute a complete rejection of the idea that the state has an 
interest in the education of its citizens which might at times 
state cannot assure the rights of parents by merely providing a single, alternative form of 
education to public school. Id. at 530 n.* (1925). 
 58 Id. at 535. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 
(2000). 
 61 See supra Part I. 
 62 See Reich, supra note 29. 
 63 See Reich, supra note 29. 
 64 See infra Part II.A. 
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justify interfering with parental decisions regarding education.65  
However, the Court warned that this power is not absolute—it 
must not unreasonably burden parents’ right to educate their 
children.66  Thus, Pierce indicates that both the state and parents 
have a valid interest in the education of children.67 
Ideally, both of these interests—which have as their object 
the promotion of excellence and maturity in the student, in the 
one case due to love and a high sense of obligation and in the 
other due to civic and economic concerns—will be in perfect 
harmony.  However, in the context of home schooling, parents 
desire absolute control over the educational environment, 
completely removed from supervision by public officials.68  
Without any governmentally imposed restrictions—including a 
basic notice requirement—on home schooling, the state’s interest 
in an educated citizenry is rendered unenforceable since the state 
cannot determine whether the children are being educated at all, 
much less, whether they are being adequately educated.  
Therefore, home schooling creates an inevitable conflict between 
the parents’ interest in directing their children’s education, free 
from any governmental impositions, and the state’s interest in 
adopting some kind of home school restrictions which ensure that 
home schooled children are adequately educated. 
There are three possible solutions to this conflict.  First, the 
parental interest could completely prevail over the state 
interest—resulting in the complete deregulation of home 
schooling.69  Second, the state interest could absolutely overcome 
the parental interest—rendering home schooling unlawful.70  
Third, the two interests could be balanced—preferably by 
restrictions that ensure that every home schooled student is 
given an adequate education without unreasonably imposing on 
the parental interest.  The appropriate solution depends on the 
legal import of the parental and state interests in education.  
Therefore, the answer to the Jonathan L. court’s request for 
“additional clarity” requires a consideration of both of these 
interests.71 
 65 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). 
 66 Id. at 535. 
 67 See infra Part II.B–C. 
 68 See Reich, supra note 29. 
 69 See infra note 104 for an example of an organization which supports this 
alternative. 
 70 See infra note 103 for an example of one thinker who supports this possibility. 
 71 Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
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B. The Fundamental Constitutional Right of Parents to Direct 
the Upbringing of Their Children 
Western civilization, with rare exceptions, has always 
recognized that parents have a special interest in directing the 
upbringing of their children.72  When America was born, no one 
dreamed that the government would ever challenge the rights of 
fit parents to exercise authority over their children.73  Hence, 
there is no express inclusion of parental rights in the 
Constitution or Bill of Rights.74  However, the United States 
Supreme Court has a long history of recognizing that the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause affords parents a 
fundamental constitutional right to direct the upbringing and 
education of their children.75 
In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court held that parents 
have a “fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, 
custody, and control of” their children.76  The Court stated that 
“the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their 
children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty 
interests recognized by this Court.”77  Further, the Court cited a 
lengthy history of Supreme Court decisional authority supporting 
its assertion that the United States Constitution protects the 
fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of their 
 72 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
401–02 (1923).  The Court discussed Plato’s theory that children should be held in 
common without knowing their parents and Sparta’s practice of taking children from 
their parents at a young age and found that: 
[a]lthough such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great 
genius, their ideas touching the relation between individual and State were 
wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will 
be affirmed that any legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people 
of a State without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution. 
Id. 
 73 Mike Farris, Parental Rights:  Why Now is the Time to Act, THE HOME SCHOOL 
COURT REPORT, Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 6. 
Moreover, it was unimaginable that a socialistic state which purported to care 
for children over and against fit and willing parents would ever result from the 
state and national governments being created in the wake of our separation 
from Britain. No one would ever envision a form of government that pitted fit 
parents against the state over the right to make decisions concerning their 
children. 
Id. at 8. 
 74 Id. at 7. 
 75 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (finding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees parents a fundamental 
constitutional right to direct the upbringing and education of their children and reciting 
an extensive history of United States Supreme Court cases recognizing that this parental 
right is rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 76 Id. at 71; id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 77 Id. at 65 (plurality opinion). 
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children.78  Among the cited authority was Wisconsin v. Yoder 
wherein the Court stated that “[t]he history and culture of 
Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern 
for the nurture and upbringing of their children.  This primary 
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now 
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”79  
The Troxel decision also referenced Pierce,80 wherein the Court 
found that the parental right to control the education of children 
was a constitutional right stating that: 
As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution 
may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to 
some purpose within the competency of the State. The fundamental 
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose 
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by 
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child 
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and 
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to 
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.81 
Pierce was itself based on the earlier Meyer v. Nebraska decision, 
which recognized “the power of parents to control the education 
of their own.”82 
In summary, the decisional history of the United States 
Supreme Court reflects the established principle that parents 
have a fundamental right, protected by the Federal Constitution, 
to direct the education of their children.  However, the state also 
has an undeniable interest in the education of its citizens, which 
may clash with this parental right. 
C. The State Interest in Ensuring that Citizens are 
Economically Independent and Civically Responsible 
Though the parental interest in directing the education of 
children rises to the level of a constitutionally protected 
fundamental right, it is not an absolute right.  The California 
Court of Appeal held as much in its Jonathan L. decision, finding 
that no “absolute right to home school exists.”83  Relying on 
United States Supreme Court and California Supreme Court 
authority, the Jonathan L. court ruled that the parental “right 
must yield to state interests in certain circumstances.”84  Thus, 
 78 Id. at 65–66. 
 79 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). 
 80 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. 
 81 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
 82 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). 
 83 Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 592 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 84 Id. at 592–93 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233–34 for the rule that “the power of the 
parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation . . . if it 
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the parental right to control the education of their child may be 
subjected to reasonable limitations where the state demonstrates 
a compelling interest that cannot be protected without the 
limitations.85 
One such compelling state interest is ensuring that its 
citizens are educated.86  The idea that governments have an 
interest in education which empowers them to exercise control 
over the education of their citizens reaches back to the 
foundations of western civilization.87  However, the fundamental 
concept of liberty upon which America was founded, and which 
remains deeply rooted in its legal traditions and constitutional 
heritage, would never allow the government to completely 
deprive parents of the control over their children short of 
extenuating circumstances.88  Nonetheless, every state does have 
an indisputable interest in ensuring that its citizens are 
educated.89 
But in what does the state’s interest in education consist?  A 
purview of American jurisprudence reveals that this interest has 
two crucial elements—the interest that citizens be civically 
responsible, and the public policy interest that citizens become 
economically self-sufficient so as not to constitute a societal 
burden. 
appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child” and In re 
Marilyn H., 851 P.2d 826, 833 (Cal. 1993) for the principle that the “welfare of a child is a 
compelling state interest that a state has not only a right, but a duty to protect” and 
finding that the state has a compelling interest in a child’s safety and therefore may 
interfere with parental right to home school where it has been judicially determined that 
there is a substantial risk to the child’s safety because the parents have been found to be 
abusive and unfit in the dependency court). 
 85 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“[T]he family itself is not 
beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. And 
neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.”) (citations 
removed). 
 86 Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 596 (stating that California has a “compelling 
interest in educating all of its children”); CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“A general diffusion of 
knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties 
of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of 
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.”); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 
(“That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its 
citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear . . . .”). 
 87 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401–02. 
 88 Id. at 402 (finding that entrusting total control of a child to public officials would 
do “violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution”); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
 89 Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 596 (finding that California has a compelling 
interest in educating its citizens).  See also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 
(1954) (“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments.”); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (“No question is raised 
concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools . . . .”). 
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Undoubtedly, any consideration of California’s interest in 
education should begin with an examination of the preeminent 
law of California—its Constitution.90  Article 9, Section 1 of the 
California Constitution states that, “A general diffusion of 
knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of 
the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall 
encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, 
scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.”91  This 
constitutional language demonstrates that California’s interest 
in education is to ensure that its citizens become civically 
responsible and thereby capable of preserving “the rights and 
liberties of the people.”92 
Since the parents’ fundamental right to control the 
upbringing and education of their children is protected by the 
Federal Constitution, the United States Supreme Court’s 
statements regarding a state’s interest in an educated citizenry 
are particularly significant.  On numerous occasions the Supreme 
Court has held that the government’s compelling interest in 
education basically consists in ensuring the civic competence and 
economic independence of its citizens.  In Yoder, the Court 
asserted that a state’s compelling interest in education consists 
in “prepar[ing] individuals to become self-reliant and self-
sufficient participants in society.”93  The Court also spoke of 
education as the preparation for “citizens to participate 
effectively and intelligently in our open political system.”94  In 
Plyler v. Doe, the Court stated that, “education provides the basic 
tools by which individuals might lead economically productive 
lives to the benefit of us all.”95  In this case, the Court held that a 
state is only required to ensure that students are provided with a 
minimum level of education so that they are able to lead 
“economically productive lives” and maintain “the fabric of our 
society.”96  In Pierce, the Court noted that a state has the power 
to require “that certain studies plainly essential to good 
citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is 
manifestly inimical to the public welfare.”97  Thus, according to 
the United States Supreme Court, a state’s interest in an 
educated citizenry is one which provides the basic competency 
 90 Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 834 (Cal. 1991) (“The 
California Constitution is the supreme law of our state . . . .”). 
 91 CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). 
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necessary to ensure that students are economically productive as 
well as civically active and conscientious citizens. 
Further, the California Supreme Court has also focused on 
the economic and civic independence of the student in discussing 
California’s interest in education.98  In Serrano v. Priest, the 
court stated that, in today’s state, education “has two significant 
aspects: first, education is a major determinant of an individual’s 
chances for economic and social success in our competitive 
society; second, education is a unique influence on a child’s 
development as a citizen and his participation in political and 
community life.”99  Beyond this, other courts have found that a 
state’s interest in education is limited to ensuring that students 
receive the minimum educational skills necessary to function as 
economically and civically independent adults.100  Finally, 
scholars have also posited that a state’s interest in education is 
limited to two basic types: economic and civic.101 
Thus, a state’s interest in education requires educators to 
provide students with the basic skills minimally necessary to 
become economically productive as well as civically conscientious 
citizens.  In other words, ‘education’—understood as the object of 
a state’s interest—refers to a basic competency in those core 
subjects necessary for independent functioning in the democratic 
society of America.102 
 98 Veterans’ Welfare Bd. v. Riley, 208 P. 678, 681 (Cal. 1922) (“It is recognized that 
the function of education is to fit the scholar for the problem of every-day life . . . .”); In re 
Shinn, 16 Cal. Rptr. 165, 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (“A primary purpose of the educational 
system is to train school children in good citizenship, patriotism and loyalty to the state 
and the nation as a means of protecting the public welfare.”). 
 99 Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255–56 (Cal. 1971). 
 100 Yuracko, supra note 8, at 155 & n.159 (citing several examples of courts which 
have “emphasized the democracy- and citizenship-promoting purposes of the 
[constitutional education] clauses as well as their importance for economic prosperity”). 
 101 Thomas W. Washburne, The Boundaries of Parental Authority: A Response to Rob 
Reich of Stanford University, April 22, 2002, http://www.hslda.org/docs/nche/ 
000010/200204230.asp (“It is well understood from a legal perspective that the 
government's compelling interest in education is limited.  It has been held numerous 
times that the government's interest in education is basically only of two varieties: civic 
and economic.”); Rob Reich, Testing the Boundaries of Parental Authority Over Education: 
The Case of Homeschooling, in NOMOS XLIII, MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION 275, 286 
(Stephen Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., 2002) (stating that “[f]irst, the state has an interest 
in educating children to become able citizens.  Second, the state has an interest in 
performing a backstop role to the parents in assuring the healthy development of children 
into independently functioning adults”); Yuracko, supra note 8, at 138–42 (citing scholars 
who argue that the state constitutions and the Federal Constitution impose a duty on 
states to ensure that their citizens receive an adequate education in basic skills and an 
opportunity for equal citizenship). 
 102 See Yuracko, supra note 8, at 136 (“[C]ourts have interpreted clauses of every type 
as obligating states to establish and operate public schools that provide children with a 
basic minimum or adequate education.”). A thorough treatment of the definition of 
‘education’ and analysis of what particular skills or subjects constitutes the minimal 
education necessary to satisfy the state’s interest is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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In summary, in the context of home schooling, the parental 
and state interests are, to a degree, in conflict.  The solution to 
this conflict depends upon the import of each interest.  The 
parents’ interest is a fundamental constitutional right to direct 
the education of their children.  The state interest is a compelling 
interest in ensuring that citizens are economically independent 
and civically responsible. 
III.  PROPOSAL:  STRIKING THE PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN 
PARENTAL AND STATE INTERESTS IN EDUCATION 
As discussed above, two authorities have valid interests in 
education—the state in ensuring that children are provided with 
an education which makes them civically responsible and 
economically independent, and the parents in directing and 
controlling the education of their children.  Home schooling 
presents unique difficulties to the state’s attempt to ensure that 
its citizens are receiving adequate education since parents 
exercise nearly absolute control over the educational 
environment.  Simply stated, home schooling creates an 
inevitable conflict between the two interests because the state 
must either leave its interest unprotected or impose on the 
parental interest.  Therefore, the question is, “What method 
should the state adopt to protect its interest without 
unreasonably imposing on the parents’ right?” 
In answering this question, some have proposed that home 
schooling be rendered illegal,103 while others have asserted that 
the state should refrain from any regulation of home schooling 
whatsoever.104  The problem with either of these positions is that 
they allow one interest to eliminate the other.105  However, each 
interest is a compelling interest which deserves protection.106  
Therefore, the best method for resolving the conflict must 
balance both interests according to their respective purposes and 
importance.  Some restrictions should be adopted to protect the 
state’s interest.  However, to prevent the state from needlessly 
trampling parental rights, these restrictions should be limited to 
those necessary to ensure that children are receiving the basic 
education sufficient to make them economically independent and 
civically responsible. 
 103 Reich, supra note 101, at 298 (“Levinson would presumably rule out 
homeschooling as an educational alternative.”). 
 104 Yuracko, supra note 8, at 127 (finding that HSLDA is committed “to ensuring 
parents’ unfettered right to homeschool”). 
 105 Further, the former proposal would violate the parents’ constitutional rights.  See 
supra Part II.B. 
 106 See supra Part II.B–C. 
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In order to avoid permitting the imposition of unreasonable 
limitations on a fundamental constitutional right, any attempt to 
infringe upon the parents’ right to direct the education of their 
children should be subjected to strict scrutiny.107  This 
heightened level of scrutiny is particularly necessary in cases 
involving home schooling since many parents have religious 
reasons for home schooling.108  Both a right to educate and a 
right to free exercise of religion are at stake for these families. 
According to the court of appeal in Jonathan L., to satisfy 
the standard of strict scrutiny “a state must establish: (1) that 
the law in question is supported by a compelling governmental 
interest and; (2) that the law is narrowly tailored to meet that 
end.”109  The Jonathan L. court noted that “[a]s an alternative 
phrasing of the second element, the statute must represent the 
‘least restrictive means’ of achieving the interest.”110  Therefore, 
California should adopt home school limitations which utilize the 
least restrictive means to protect its interest in education—that 
is, restrictions which encroach as little as possible on the parents’ 
fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their children. 
 107 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I would 
apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights.”); Jonathan L. v. Superior 
Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 592–93 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that “[i]n light of Troxel, 
two California cases have applied strict scrutiny in cases alleging violations of the 
parental liberty interest.”  Also, that “if a restriction on the right satisfies strict scrutiny, 
the restriction is constitutional”) (citations omitted).  See also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65, 
where the Court found that: 
[t]he Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  We have long 
recognized that the Amendment's Due Process Clause, like its Fifth 
Amendment counterpart, “guarantees more than fair process.”  The Clause also 
includes a substantive component that “provides heightened protection against 
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests. 
(plurality opinion) (citations omitted); id. at 76–77 (Souter, J., concurring) (rejecting 
the “State's particular best-interests standard” as too loose a standard which 
renders the statute “unconstitutional on its face” since it violates the fundamental 
parental constitutional right to direct the upbringing of children). 
 108 See supra Part II; Yuracko, supra note 8, at 126–27 (finding that modern home 
schooling is dominated by a conservative Christian movement); Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 592 (citing prior cases to find that “it has been suggested that when a parental 
liberty interest claim is combined with a free exercise claim, strict scrutiny is required”) 
(emphasis omitted).  Numerous states have enacted legislation which requires state 
action to pass strict scrutiny if it substantially burdens parents’ free exercise of religion.  
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 52-571b (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03 (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402 
(2006); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15 (West 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.302 (West 2009); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.700 (LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (LexisNexis 
2006); 51 OKLA. STAT. ANN . tit. 51, § 253 (West 2008); 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2404 (West 
Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40 (2005); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 57-2.02. (2007). 
 109 Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 593. 
 110 Id. (quoting Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 
91 (Cal. 2004)). 
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First, this Comment proposes that the California Legislature 
legalize home schooling in the state by enacting a statutory 
exception to the state’s compulsory school attendance statute.  
Second, to adequately protect California’s interest in an educated 
citizenry, this Comment suggests that the government adopt two 
home schooling limitations: one which requires parents to file an 
annual notice of intent to home school and, another which 
requires home schooled students to take annual standardized 
tests. 
A. Enacting a Home Schooling Exemption to California’s 
Compulsory School Attendance Statute 
The court in Jonathan L. observed that the reason California 
has no “objective criteria and oversight for home schooling” rests 
in the fact that home schooling “is permitted in California as the 
result of implicit legislative recognition rather than explicit 
legislative action.”111  The court of appeal noted that home 
schooling parents must theoretically adhere to some of the other 
requirements of the private school exemption to California’s 
compulsory school attendance statute.112  However, the court also 
found that, practically, there is no “enforcement mechanism” to 
ensure that, beyond filing a private school affidavit, home 
schooling parents are complying with the statutory requirements 
of the private school exemption.113 
Indeed, even though the Jonathan L. court ultimately 
concluded that this exemption applies to home schooling, it noted 
that past case authority and legislative history appears to 
conflict with this ruling.114  To further complicate the issue, 
 111 Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 595. 
 112 Id. at 595 n.35.  The court noted that: 
The remaining restrictions on home schooling in California, which are not at 
issue in this case, include: (a) home schooling parents must file a private school 
affidavit; (b) home schooling parents must be capable of teaching; (c) home 
schooling parents must teach in English and shall offer instruction in the 
subjects required to be taught in public schools; and (d) home school education 
must be a ‘full-time’ school. 
Id. 
 113 Id. at 596 (“California impliedly allows parents to home school as a private school, 
but has provided no enforcement mechanism.  As long as the local school district verifies 
that a private school affidavit has been filed, there is no provision for further oversight of 
a home school.”). 
 114 Id. at 585–90.  The court noted that “two California cases which have addressed 
the issue have concluded that a home school cannot constitute a private full-time day 
school[,]” and that 
[t]he most persuasive interpretation of the legislative history of the original 
statutory provisions supports the conclusion that a home school is not a private 
school.  However, the most logical interpretation of subsequent legislative 
enactments and regulatory provisions supports the conclusion that a home 
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numerous legislative enactments have created exceptions, for 
home schools, to various requirements imposed on traditional 
private schools.115  In fact, according to the court of appeal, many 
of the restrictions pertaining to private schools “would be absurd 
if applied to every home school.”116  Hence, the very legislative 
acts upon which the Jonathan L. court based its holding—those 
that purport to apply to all private schools but which include 
exceptions for home schools—draw out the markedly different 
characters of traditional private schools and home schools and 
create double standards.  Consequently, the regulatory scheme of 
the private school exemption makes it virtually impossible for 
California to ensure that its interest in education is being 
protected in home schools—in part, no doubt, because the 
exemption was designed for traditional private schools, not home 
schools.117 
For these reasons, this Comment proposes first that the 
California Legislature adopt a new statutory exemption to the 
state’s compulsory school attendance statute which explicitly 
permits home schooling in California.  The benefit of such an 
explicit exemption is manifold.  First, any question as to the 
validity of home schooling under California law will be put to 
rest.118  Second, creating a distinct home schooling exemption will 
eliminate the unnecessary legal complexity and confusion 
generated by the legislatively created “home school” exceptions to 
the numerous regulations and statutes intended to apply to 
traditional private schools.  That is, the creation of a new 
statutory exemption for home schooling will simplify the body of 
law relating to California’s compulsory school attendance statute.  
Third, and arguably most important, an exemption which 
explicitly permits home schooling serves as the basis for adopting 
explicit home school restrictions to protect California’s interest in 
education. 
school can, in fact, fall within the private school exception to the general 
compulsory education law. 
Id. 
 115 Id. at 588–89. 
 116 Id. at 589 n.28. 
 117 Id. at 587–88. 
 118 See, e.g., In re Rachel L., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (decertified for 
publication); In re Shinn, 16 Cal. Rptr. 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); People v. Turner, 263 
P.2d 685 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1953).  But see Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 576 
(holding that “California statutes permit home schooling as a species of private school 
education”). 
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B. Adopting Specific Limitations on Home Schooling in 
California 
An explicit exemption permitting home schooling is only the 
first step which serves as a basis for adopting the restrictions 
necessary to protect California’s interest in an educated 
citizenry.  As discussed above, the government should only adopt 
limitations that pass the strict scrutiny test, that is, are the least 
restrictive means to protect California’s interest.119  Hence, this 
section first considers home school limitations widely used by 
other states.  Second, it suggests and discusses two home 
schooling restrictions; namely, mandatory filing of notice of 
intent to home school and standardized testing.  Third, this 
section concludes with an analysis of the reasons for rejecting the 
other commonly adopted limitations. 
1.  Common Limitations Imposed by Other States 
In order to protect their interest in education, other states 
have enacted explicit home schooling statutes and imposed 
limitations on home schools.120  A summary of the widely used 
restrictions is helpful for two reasons.  First, the fact that these 
restrictions became law indicates that a significant number of 
legislators thought they would be effective.  Second, that these 
limitations have remained law in many states suggests that 
experience has bestowed its imprimatur upon them. 
 119 See supra Part III. 
 120 A majority of the states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes which 
expressly apply to home schooling.  Further, the rest of the states permit home schooling 
under more general statutory exceptions to compulsory school attendance laws.  ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-802 (2004); ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 6-15-501 to -508 (2007); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104.5 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2703A (2007); D.C. CODE 
ANN. §§ 38-202, -205 (LexisNexis 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.41 (West 2005); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 20-2-690(c) (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 302A-1132(a)(5) (LexisNexis 2006); 
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 299A.1−299A.10 (West 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:236 (2001); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5001-A (2008); MD. CODE ANN, EDUC. § 7-301 (LexisNexis 
2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1561(3)(f) (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120A.22 
(West 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91(3)(c) (2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 167.031(2) (West 
2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-102(2)(e) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 392.700, 
392.070 (LexisNexis 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193-A:1 to -10 (LexisNexis 2006); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-2 to -2.1 (LexisNexis 2006); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3204(1) (McKinney 
2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-563 to -565 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15.1-20-02 to -04, 
15.1-23-1 to -19 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.04(A)(2) (West 2005); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 339.030, 339.035 (West 2007); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1327.1 (West 2006); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-19-1(a) (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-40 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 49-6-3050 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-102(2) (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, 
§§ 11(a)(21), 166b (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 28A.200.010, 28A.225.010 (West 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-8-1a(c) (LexisNexis 
2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 118.15, 118.165(1) (West 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4-101, 
-102 (2009). 
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The most prevalent restriction enacted requires parents to 
file an affidavit of intent to home school with local school board 
or county superintendent of schools.121  Nearly half of the states 
also require parents to keep records of courses taken, attendance, 
or academic progress.122  A significant number of states require 
the instructor[s] to meet certain minimum qualifications such as 
being “competent” to teach, passing a state or national teaching 
test, having a high school diploma or general equivalency 
diploma, having a baccalaureate, or having a state teaching 
certification.123  About half of the states utilize standardized 
testing as a method for ensuring that home schooled students are 
 121 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-802 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-15-503 (2007); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104.5(3)(e) (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2704 (2007); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.41 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(c) (2009); HAW. ADMIN. 
R. § 8-12-4(5) (2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.030 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 17:236.1 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5001-A (2008); MD. CODE REGS. 
10.01.01.B (2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91(3)(c) (2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 167.042 
(West 2000); Mont. Code Ann. § 20-5-109 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.700 
(LexisNexis 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193-A:5 (LexisNexis 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 22-1-2.1 (LexisNexis 2006); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 100.10 (2008); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-552, -560 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-23-02 (2003); OHIO ADMIN. 
CODE § 3301-34-03(A) (2009); OR. ADMIN. R. 581-021-0026(4) (2009); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-1327.1 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-27-3 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 49-6-3050(b)(1), (8) (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-102 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, 
§ 166b (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 28A.200.010(1) (West 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-8-1(c) (LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 115.30(3) (West 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-102(b) (2009). 
 122 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104.5(3)(g) (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, 
§ 2704 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.41 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(c) (2009); 
HAW. ADMIN. R. § 8-12-15 (2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-33-2-20 (West 2008); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 159.040 (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5001-A (2008); MD. 
CODE REGS. 10.01.01.D-E (2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120A.22 (West 2008); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 167.031.2(2)(a) (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-109 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 193-A:6(I) (LexisNexis 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-2.1 (LexisNexis 2006); N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 100.10 (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-548, 556 (2007); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-23-05 (2003); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1327.1(e)(1) (West 
2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-40 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-27-3 (2004); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 49-6-3050(b)(2) (2009). 
 123 GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(c)(3) (2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 299A.2 (West 2009); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1111 (2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-2.1(C) (2008); N.Y. EDUC. LAW 
§ 3204 (McKinney 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-564 (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-23-
03 (2003); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3301-34-03(A)(9) (2008); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1327.1(a) (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-40(1) (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-
3050(b)(4), (7) (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 28A.225.010 (West 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-8-(c) (LexisNexis 2008).  But see 
Mazanec v. N. Judson-San Pierre Sch. Corp., 614 F. Supp. 1152, 1160 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (“It 
is now doubtful that the requirements of a formally licensed or certified teacher as there 
required would now pass constitutional muster.”); People v. Dejonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 129 
(Mich. 1993) (“We hold that the teacher certification requirement is an unconstitutional 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as applied to families whose 
religious convictions prohibit the use of certified instructors.”). 
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making adequate progress.124  Finally, a few jurisdictions permit 
“home visits” by school officials.125 
This Comment proposes that the California Legislature 
adopt two of these limitations to provide sufficient oversight and 
effective enforcement for protecting California’s interest in an 
educated citizenry. 
2.  Requiring Parents to File an Annual Affidavit of Intent 
California should require all home schooling parents to 
annually submit an affidavit containing a statement of intent to 
home school.  This limitation serves the purpose of putting 
California on notice as to which children are being educated at 
home.  Notice is a sine qua non for protecting California’s interest 
in education because it allows the government to distinguish 
between truant students and home schooling students.  Further, 
it provides the government with information needed to enforce 
the standardized testing restriction.  Finally, it provides the 
government with statistical information which can be used in 
making critical decisions regarding the public school system. 
This restriction has been adopted in a majority of states, 
indicating nearly universal consensus as to its value in ensuring 
a state’s interest in education.126  It is also minimally intrusive 
on the parents’ right since it requires a negligible amount of 
effort on the part of the parents—they need only provide basic 
information once a year to the local school superintendent or 
board of education.  No less intrusive method could provide 
California with notice regarding which children are being home 
schooled.  Further—inasmuch as it is already required under the 
private school exemption—this restriction will not change the 
current impositions on home schooling in California.127 
 124 ARK. CODE. ANN. § 6-15-504 (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104.5(3)(f) 
(West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(c)(7) (2009); HAW. ADMIN. R. § 8-12-18 (2009); 
IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281-31.4 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:236.1 (2001); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5001-A (2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120A.22 Subd.11 (West 2008); 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-318(5) (LexisNexis 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-A:6 
(LexisNexis 2006); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 100.10 (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§§ 115C-549, -564 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15.1-23-09, -11 (2003); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 
§ 3301-34-04 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 339.035(3) to (5) (West 2007); 24 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-1327.1(e)(1) (West 2006); S.C. CODE § 59-65-40 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 13-27-3, -7 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3050(b)(5) (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
16, § 166b (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1(C) (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 28A.200.010 (West 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-8-1(c)(2)(D) (LexisNexis 2008). 
 125 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.040 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120A.26 Subd.1 
(West 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-318(5) (LexisNexis 2007) (granting the Nebraska 
State Board of Education the power to adopt regulations including testing and visitation). 
 126 See supra note 121. 
 127 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48222 (West 2006). 
Do Not Delete 4/14/2010 10:37 PM 
412 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 13:391
3.  Requiring Students to Undergo Standardized Testing 
Merely requiring an affidavit of intent to home school, 
although minimally intrusive, does not adequately protect 
California’s interest in an educated citizenry.  That is, filing an 
affidavit in no way guarantees that children are receiving the 
basic education required to become economically independent 
and civically conscientious.128  Hence, the government should 
enact a second restriction requiring home schooled students to 
take annual standardized tests.129  This limitation enables 
California to ensure that every home schooled student is making 
adequate academic progress since a passing score means that the 
student has acquired at least everything that he must know for 
the core subjects in his grade level.130  Further, the determination 
is made using an impartial methodology—standardized testing. 
A standardized testing requirement passes muster under 
strict scrutiny.131  It does not infringe upon the parents’ freedom 
to direct the child’s education in any way—except to the extent 
that the parents must provide the child with minimal 
competence in basic, core subjects.  Further, the imposition on 
the parents’ time is slight since the testing will only be 
administered once a year.  Additionally, nearly half of the states 
have adopted standardized testing as a way of establishing that 
home schooling children are making adequate progress.132  
Finally, standardized testing is single-handedly sufficient to 
ensure adequate academic progress.133 
 128 See supra Part II.C. 
 129 Although standardized testing satisfies strict scrutiny, the California 
Legislature—in recognition of the different circumstances and exigencies of each family—
may choose to include an exception to the requirement of annual standardized testing in 
the event that the family and the local school district mutually agree to some other 
reasonable method for guaranteeing that the home schooled children are receiving a 
minimally adequate education.  Such an exception would generate extra costs for the local 
school district which would have to analyze and approve an alternative method for 
protecting the state’s interest on a case-by-case basis.  Therefore, the decision to allow an 
alternative method should be left to the discretion of the local school board—the parents 
would have no right to require consideration of an alternative method to standardized 
testing.  For similar reasons, the school board would not have the authority to require 
parents, who are in compliance with the standardized testing requirement, to adopt an 
alternative method for ensuring the state’s interest in education. 
 130 Standardized Testing and Reporting Program, http://www.startest.org/cst.html 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2010) (stating that California Standards Tests “measure students’ 
progress toward achieving California’s state-adopted academic content standards, which 
describe what students should know and be able to do in each grade and subject tested”). 
 131 See Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1043 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding “the state 
has no means less restrictive than its administration of achievement tests to ensure that 
its citizens are being properly educated”). 
 132 See supra Part III.B.1. 
 133 The California Department of Education should adopt remediation regulations 
applicable to cases where a child’s test scores show inadequate progress.  Given that 
students perform poorly on standardized tests for a wide variety of reasons—not all of 
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4.  An Analysis of the Rejected Limitations 
In contrast to these two simple limitations, the other 
commonly used restrictions, discussed above, either do not as 
effectively advance the state interest, or unnecessarily trample 
parents’ fundamental constitutional right to direct the education 
of their children.134  Clearly, adding any of these restrictions to 
the two proposed would violate the least restrictive means prong 
of the strict scrutiny standard since these two alone adequately 
protect California’s interest in education. 
As stated above, many states require parents to keep 
detailed records.135  This requirement constitutes a regular, often 
daily, imposition on the instructor and therefore is a much more 
burdensome method for ensuring that the students are making 
adequate progress than the standardized testing requirement.136  
Hence, this restriction would probably not pass muster under 
strict scrutiny. 
which are related to academic ability—the remedial response should not be to 
immediately suspend the parents’ right to educate their child at home.  Such a draconian 
response is probably an unconstitutional violation of the parents’ fundamental rights.  
However, some remedial response is necessary if California’s interest in education is to 
have any meaningful protection at all.  Although a full consideration of the best remedial 
regulations is beyond the scope of this Comment, it should be noted that other states use 
remedial responses ranging from requiring the child to take another test before the end of 
the school year to requiring the child to be evaluated for learning disabilities and having a 
certified teacher supervise the child’s progress during the remediation period.  See, e.g., 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104.5(5) (West 2005) (requiring child to be placed in a 
traditional school if child scores at or below the thirteenth percentile and the child’s 
scores do not improve upon re-testing using an approved test selected by parents); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 299A.6 (West 2008) (requiring child who scores below the thirtieth percentile 
to be placed in a traditional school unless the child receives a better score on a second test 
administered before the beginning of the next school year or the director of the 
department of education approves a plan of remediation); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-A:6 
(LexisNexis 2006) (giving parents one year to bring child’s educational progress up to “a 
level commensurate with his ability”); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15.1-23-11 to -13 (2003) 
(requiring child to be evaluated for disabilities by a multidisciplinary assessment team, if 
child’s scores fall below the thirtieth percentile, and requiring parents to file a plan of 
remediation developed in consultation with a certified teacher); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 
§§ 3301-34-04, -05 (2009) (requiring parents to submit a remediation plan and quarterly 
progress reports if child’s score falls below the twenty-fifth percentile); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 339.035(4) (West 2007) (requiring up to three additional tests, if child’s score is 
below the fifteenth percentile and continues to decline, and granting the superintendent 
of education the discretion to order the child’s education supervised by a certified teacher 
or to place the child in a traditional school for up to twelve months); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 13-27-7 (2004) (allowing school board to refuse to grant a certificate of excuse to home 
school for a child who makes “less than satisfactory” academic progress); W. VA. CODE 
§ 18-8-1(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring parents to initiate remediation program if 
child’s score is below the fiftieth percentile and allowing the superintendent of education 
to seek court order denying right to home school if there is clear and convincing evidence 
that the child is suffering from educational neglect). 
 134 See supra Part III.B.1. 
 135 See supra Part III.B.1. 
 136 For an example of home schooling regulations requiring parents to maintain 
attendance records, see supra note 122. 
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Some states require the instructor to have minimum 
qualifications such as a teaching certificate or a college degree.137  
The teaching certificate requirement is inadequate because it 
does not ensure that the parent will actually provide higher 
quality education.138  Similarly, a college degree requirement 
insufficiently guarantees adequate instruction since merely 
having some degree does not assure that the parent can impart 
the basic required skills.139 
Finally, a few states have procedures for “home visits” by 
school officials.140  These visits probably violate strict scrutiny 
since parents could submit any information regarding their 
instructional format without a highly intrusive home visit.141 
In summary, the government should adopt two home 
schooling restrictions from those commonly used in other states; 
namely, the requirement that parents file an annual notice of 
intent to home school and the requirement that home schooled 
children take an annual standardized test.  These two 
restrictions pass muster under a strict scrutiny analysis and 
together assure California’s interest in economically independent 
and civically responsible citizens.  The government should not 
adopt any additional limitations to avoid violating the least 
restrictive means prong of the strict scrutiny test. 
CONCLUSION 
The Jonathan L. court’s decision to overrule its earlier 
holding and recognize home schooling as legal in California 
demonstrates that home schooling is no longer a fringe curiosity 
but has become a socially accepted form of education.  However, 
as the court of appeal stated, California has no regulatory 
scheme which allows the state to guarantee that its interest in 
economically independent and civically conscientious citizens is 
 137 See supra Part III.B.1. 
 138 People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 141 (Mich. 1993) (finding that “empirical 
studies disprove a positive correlation between teacher certification and quality 
education”). 
 139 This is also true of other instructor qualification requirements of this type, such as 
having a high school diploma or general equivalency diploma. 
 140 See supra Part III.B.1. 
 141 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (establishing privacy as an inalienable right 
belonging to all people); Brunelle v. Lynn Pub. Sch., 702 N.E.2d 1182, 1184, 1186 (Mass. 
1998) (finding that “[w]ith appropriate testing procedures or progress reports, there may 
be no need for periodic on-site visits,” viewing a home visit requirement “carefully in light 
of constitutional considerations,” and finding that such a requirement “may call into play 
issues of family privacy in seeking to keep the home free of unwarranted intrusion”). 
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adequately protected in each home school.142  Hence, under 
current California law, the state’s interest in education is put at 
risk by home schooling.143  Therefore, the government should 
explicitly regulate home schooling.  However, parents have a 
fundamental constitutional right to direct the upbringing and 
education of their children.144  Thus, any attempt to restrict home 
schooling must pass muster under judicial strict scrutiny so that 
it does not trample this parental right.145 
In answer to the Jonathan L. court’s plea for clarity, the 
California Legislature should legalize home schooling by enacting 
a home schooling exemption to the state’s compulsory school 
attendance statute.  This new exemption would lay to rest any 
question of the validity of home schooling in California.  
Moreover, it would simplify the law relating to California’s 
compulsory school attendance statute.  Finally it would serve as 
the basis for adopting restrictions which advance California’s 
interest in education. 
Additionally, the government should impose two limitations 
on home schooling: a filing of annual notice of intent to home 
school requirement, and an annual standardized testing 
requirement.  The first requirement allows California to 
determine which students are truant and which are home 
schooled, to enforce the second requirement; and to collect 
information regarding education in California.  This requirement 
clearly passes strict scrutiny since no viable, less intrusive means 
exist for informing the state of the parents’ intent to home school.  
However, this requirement alone is not sufficient to guarantee 
that students are receiving a minimally adequate education. 
Therefore, the second restriction enables the state to ensure 
that students are receiving an adequate education by testing 
their basic competency levels in the core classes required by the 
California school system.  This limitation passes muster under 
strict scrutiny because it does not significantly infringe upon the 
parents’ freedom or ability to direct the child’s education and has 
been adopted, in some form or another, by nearly half of the 
states.146  Further, it guarantees that the child is receiving an 
adequate education without requiring further limitations on the 
parental right.  In contrast, the other restrictions widely used by 
 142 Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 
(noting that California lacks “regulatory framework for homeschooling” and stating that 
“additional clarity in this area of the law would be helpful”). 
 143 See supra Part III.A. 
 144 See supra Part II.B. 
 145 See supra Part III. 
 146 See supra Part III.B.1 and 3. 
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different states either constitute a greater imposition on parental 
rights or do not as effectively protect the state’s interest.147 
Finally, there may be pragmatic reasons for California to 
place even less restrictive limitations on home schooling than 
required by the Federal Constitution.  For example, home 
schooling’s more individualized focus gives parents greater 
flexibility and thereby permits them to adapt the curriculum to 
take into account different learning styles of their children.  
Further, home schooling allows for experimentation in 
educational methodologies in a way which is difficult, if not 
impossible, in a large, bureaucratic public education system.148  
Thus, relaxed home schooling regulations may encourage the 
variable and experimental aspects of home schooling.149 
 147 See supra Part III.B.4. 
 148 Such experimentation and improvement may be badly needed since some believe 
that the public school system in California is providing an inferior education to many 
students. See, e.g., Stanford University School of Education, News Bureau, 
http://ed.stanford.edu/suse/news-bureau/displayRecord.php?tablename=press&id=58 (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2010) (“California students, parents and community leaders agree: 
comprehensive change is needed to fix education system.”). 
 149 For example, yearly standardized testing may limit the parents’ ability to adopt 
alternative educational methods because of the need to ensure that their children are 
annually advancing in certain subjects, at a certain rate, so that they can pass the tests. 
